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Since the early 1960s, the Department of Defense and
the air transport industry have seen a downward trend in the
nximber of new aircraft production starts. One of the effects
of fewer new development programs has been a declining level
of practical design experience acquired by individual engi-
neers in aerospace design organizations. When compared to
the growing need for design experience build-up, a result of
expanding technology, the situation becomes worse. To
acquire needed levels of practical design experience, feed-
back and utilization of operational experience is becoming
increasingly important. Responsive feedback systems are
used by the commercial air transport industry for providing
operational experience applicable to product improvement and
new development programs. Feedback systems in Naval aviation
provide data and information for application primarily in
areas of manpower and material management. This thesis
analyzes and discusses the present situation and basic needs
for operational experience feedback in aircraft design.
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The assistance provided by the many individuals contacted
during the course of this thesis was invaluable. Their
candor and willingness to contributed to what upper-management
may consider a non-glamour issue not only made study of
operational experience feedback and its application to the
design process possible, but also potentially useful.





Why is it that the Department of the Navy frequently
experiences similar or repetitive undesirable design charac-
teristics from one aeronautical weapon system development
program to the next? Why is it that the many enhancing design
characteristics seen on currently deployed and many retired
aircraft are not exploited during new development programs?
Questions of this type, asked by fleet operating units and
test and evaluation activities, have surfaced as a result of
the rapidly increasing number of engineering change proposals,
escalating life cycle costs, under-achieved mission readiness
rates, and in many cases, incompatibilities with military
operating environments.
Although the above questions reflect a viable problem,
they are not intended to imply that the Navy is unconcerned
about operational experience applicable to design of aircraft
weapon systems. On the contrary, ambitious programs were
undertaken by the Naval Air Systems Command during the 1970s
on grappling the many problems associated with systems
effectiveness parameters applicable to major system acquisi-
tion. The programs emphasized utilizing available operational
experience for developing specific and more meaningful
specification requirements.
While considerable effort has been expended on developing
specification requirements, little effort has been allocated
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to improving operational experience feedback from fleet
operators to industry designers. Inadequacies in current
feedback systems inhibit effective utilization of operational
experience in the front end of new design. Hence, it is this
notion that was pursued by this study.
A. PURPOSE OF THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First/ to
investigate, analyze, and describe the present situation and
basic trends regarding feedback of operational experience
from user to manufacturer of commercial and military aircraft;
and second, to summarize and discuss the findings.
B. SCOPE OF STUDY
Constraints of time and resources limited this investiga-
tion to the Department of the Navy for military aircraft and
to the Lockheed-California Company for commercial transport
aircraft.
The scope of this study is confined to:
1. Investigating the validity and need for feedback
of operational experience;
2. Studying feedback sources on the commercial side
of the aerospace industry;
3. Studying current Naval Aviation feedback sources;
and
4. Determining current situation for feedback of
operational experience to designers.
14

To avoid later confusion, it is imperative that the
reader understands that this thesis addresses experience
feedback only. The equally important topic of experience
transfer is not within the scope of study. Sub-section E
of the Introduction and Figure 1 briefly differentiate the
two. While feedback is basic to operational experience
build-up within a given design engineering organization,
transfer provides for sharing feedback experience with other
organizations as well as distributing it to those individuals
who have a "need to know" inside an organization.
C. METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED
One of the difficulties encountered in the study was
finding reference sources, government or industry, that
addressed the subject directly. Extensive reasearch revealed
little work has been published in this topic area.
The major source of information used as the primary basis
for study was obtained through extensive personal interviews
conducted by the author. All interviews were begun with a
complete explanation of the nature of the research. The
interviews were not formalized but were tailored to the
interviewee and were intended to provide the author with an
insight into the atmosphere, attitude and functions of the
organization being interviewed. The goal was to establish
a rapport with the interviewee and then find out his candid
opinions on the various aspects of operational experience
15

compilation, feedback and utilization. Organizations
contacted and interviewed during the course of the study are
listed in Appendix A.
D. GLOSSARY OF TERMS
The following brief descriptions are provided to clarify
some basic terms as treated by this study.
1. Design has been defined in many ways. For the
present purposes, among the many aspects of design,
an emphasis on learning from past experience is of
special importance.
2. Aircraft Design offers an outstanding example for the
complex demands and responsibilities in the field of
design. Performance, safety, cost, weight, relia-
bility and maintainability are some of the contra-
dictory demands which have to be met and reconciled.
The responsibilities of the designer extend over the
whole service life of the aircraft, with innumerable
combinations of environmental and operational
conditions
.
3. Data are the original and detailed representations
of events in the physical world. Data are the raw
material from which information is manufactured by
operations known collectively as data processing.
4. Information can be thought of as processed data or
data given context. Information is that knowledge
that can be applied in current operations.
16

5. Experience is a special type of information. The
word experience has its origin in the Latin "from
having gone through" — in contrast to the word
theory, which is derived from the Greek "to look at."
Experience refers to having gone through a real-life
process. A very large number of parameters may be
involved and it is of paramount importance to
separate essential from non-essential parameters.
6. Operational has to do with the operation or use of
a system, sub-system, component in the environment
and for the purpose which it was intended.
7. Feedback , in the present context, pertains to the
flow of operational data, information, and/or
experience from the user back to the contractor.
8. Transfer pertains to the dissemination or exchange
of operational data, information, and/or experience
among contractors, as shown in Figure 1, or among
individuals within an organization.
9. Experience Feedback in Aircraft Design is concerned
with transmitting "lessons learned" in operational
experience to the organization responsible for the
product.
10. Experience Transfer in Aircraft Design is concerned
with transmitting "lessons learned" in operational
experience to designers throughout the industry who




















Figure h FEEDBACK FLOW AND TRANSFER SIMPLIFIED.
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II. BASIC TRENDS IN AIRCRAFT DESIGN
A. BACKGROUND
Without doubt, the best and most effective implementation
of operational experience occurred during the pioneering
years of powered flight. As both designer and user, the
early pioneers, such as the Wright Brothers and Glenn
Curtiss, were able to readily learn from their previous
designs and immediately apply the experiences to their next
design decision. During the infant years of aviation, design
groups remained small. However, as aviation grew into an
industry, and the technology associated with flight became
more involved, the likelihood of the designer also being the
ultimate user became rare. Nonetheless, the customer or
ultimate user of these early aircraft, more often than not,
worked hand-in-hand with the designer in an effort to gain
the best possible design consistent with technology and
operational experience of that time.
By the early 1930s, designers knew that the successful
aircraft of the next generation would be more complex with
retractable landing gear and all the other emerging refine-
ments of variable-pitch propellers, wing flaps, control
surface trim tabs, autopilot, de-icing equipment and radio
navigation capabilities. The talent required to success-
fully design and build an aircraft of this complexity was
beyond the ability of the " jack-of-all-trades" designer of
19

the time. Required were the coordinated inputs from a
number of growing aeronautical specialists in such disciplines
as aerodynamics, structures, propulsion, hydraulics, and
avionics. Hence, the design organization was born.
During the 1960s, the aircraft industry sought to improve
the rapport between designer and user by introducing formal
feedback systems by which operational experience from past
aircraft development programs could be compiled, transferred,
and utilized on derivative or next generation development
programs. This interest largely resulted from rapidly
escalating program development costs and the "hard-nosed"
position taken first by the air transport industry and later
by the Department of Defense (DoD) to improve life-cycle
costs through improved reliability and maintainability.
B. FEWER NEW DEVELOPMENT STARTS
A long-term reduction in the number of new development
starts for DoD began in the second half of the 1950s. Trend
data indicates a steady declining number of new aircraft
production starts. The trend as shown in Figure 2 appears
to be approaching an asymptote of just under one when taking
a seven year moving average. This equates to a projected
1.5 new starts between 1985-1995. [18:37]
This notation is used throughout the report for sources
of major reference. The first number is the source listed
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This downward trend has had an impact on all military
aircraft programs including fighter, attack, special mission,
transport, utility and helicopter types. Illustrative of
the trend is Figure 3, which depicts specific new development
program starts for tactical (fighter and attack) aircraft.
Of particular note is the slowdown in prototype development
for the decade between 1959 and 1969. Only two new starts
occurred during the period, largely a result of McNamara '
s
"paper competition" policies that disallowed prototype
development. The spurt of new programs begun during the
early 1970s was most likely a "catch-up" of programs post-
poned or suppressed during the 1960s.
The commercial air transport industry experienced a
similar downturn in new aircraft developments. Current
inventory airline flight equipment, including Boeing B707/
B727/B737/B747, McDonnell Douglas DC-8/DC-9/DC-10 , and
Lockheed L-1011 aircraft, are a product of the 1950s and
1960s. Until Boeing's early 1979 announcement to launch
development of their next generation B757 and B767 aircraft,
the industry had not seen a new development start for a
decade.
Greater periods of lapsed time between military and
commercial aircraft development programs, a result of fewer
new starts, has had an adverse effect on retained employment
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C. DETERIORATING DESIGN TEAM CONTINUITY
Maintaining design team continuity is another of the
growing concerns to the aerospace industry. The era of
fewer new starts and resultant excess engineering capacity
has ushered in disenchantment among aircraft designers and
engineering professionals for long-term career opportunities
in the industry. Many of these experienced professionals
have pursued more promising career opportunities in another
industry. Others are "job-hopping" to companies that have
been successful in landing contracts for new development
starts
.
Continuity within engineering design teams is obviously
important and was recognized as such by industry veteran
Mr. Edward H. Heinemann in a presentation on "New Airplane
Development." Heinemann stated:
Successful manufacturers the world over have
found continuity of design and manufacture a
necessity. Furthermore, three to five projects
in various stages of development are necessary
at all times to remain competitive and retain
healthy design organizations. Continuity is one
of the most important key words in this business.
[10:1327]
Similar concern over continuity is shared by the Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) . In a presentation on
"NAVAIR Program Analysis and Evaluation (Past Experience)
"
to the Naval Aviation Executive Institute, Mr. George A.
Spangenburg expressed his concern for the loss of technical
continuity within the Systems and Engineering Group (NAVAIR-
05) of the NAVAIRSYSCOM. [25] Spangenburg, who retired
24

from NAVAIR-05 as a technical director in the mid-1970s,
indicated the key factors resulting in continuing loss of
NAVAIR technical continuity include fewer new starts, long-
term reduction in NAVAIR manning levels for engineering/
technical specialists, and changing aircraft weapon system
procurement policies
.
D. SCARCITY OF EXPERIENCED AEROSPACE ENGINEERS
Aerospace designers are becoming an "endangered species"
in the nation's aerospace industry. The reduction in the
supply of experienced designers has been largely a result
of fewer needs by industry and better career opportunities
in analytical specialization.
Also contributing to the scarcity of engineering
personnel was the severe economic recession experienced by
the industry during the early 19 70s, and the anti-technology
movement among American youth inspired by the Vietnam war,
both of which were responsible for directing many college
students away from aerospace.
Termination of the supersonic transport development
program in conjunction with waning design engineering
requirements for the B747, DC-10 and L-1011 wide-body
programs produced large scale lay-offs among engineers.
The first to receive employment termination notices were
those personnel with least seniority and experience; thus,
most of the reduction in engineering manpower took place
among young engineers. Fewer young engineers are now
25

interested in entering this industry typified by dramatic
economic ups and downs. Consequences of this situation will
be seen in the 19 80s when comparatively few experienced
engineers will be available to fill the void created by
attrition of the senior engineering force. [17; 37]
The Boeing Company is already feeling the "sting" in
the shortage of aerospace engineers required for development
of its new B757 and B767 jet airliners. To overcome this
shortage, Boeing has undertaken a unique method to build up
its engineering staff. It is borrowing engineers from other
aerospace contractors attempting to win lucrative subcontracts
in the B757 and B767 programs. "We simply told them that
without the engineers there would be no subcontract awards,"
says Boeing's Director of Personnel, Frank Gregory. "The
engineer shortage is so severe that it was a do-or-die
situation." [20:49]
While Boeing's great "engineer grab" may provide the
numbers of engineers required for the B757 and B767 projects,
it must be recognized that many will lack the "home-grown"
experience and expertise unique to the design of jet airliners
upon which Boeing has built a world-wide reputation.
E. LOWER LEVELS OF EXPERIENCE BUILD-UP
Lower comparable levels of experience build-up per unit
of time in hardware design by junior design engineers, also
a result of fewer new starts, is yet another concern.
Attainment of the many practical considerations and skills
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for application in the hardware design phase of the design
process comes primarily from experience. Dr. Rene H. Miller,
MIT's Aeronautics and Astronautics Department head, is of
the opinion that the engineering involved in detailed hard-
ware design requires less of what is taught in the universi-
ties than of what is taught by experience [12:29]. Without
repetitive on-the-job design assignments an appreciation of
past design experience and its influence on future design
efforts is most difficult to achieve.
F. GREATER FINANCIAL RISK
Historically, aeronautical weapon systems have become
increasingly more complex with each passing generation of
aircraft. For the most part, this complexity is a direct
result of incorporating high technology and more demanding
systems performance requirements.
Directly proportional and related to the trend of
increasing complexity is the trend of increasing aircraft
cost. It can be shown that the unit cost of military air-
craft is increasing at an exponential rate. The historical
trend of escalating unit cost for tactical aircraft is shown
in Figure 4. From the Wright Brothers to today's high tech-
nology, high performance F-18, the cost of an individual
military aircraft has invariable grown by a factor of four
every 10 years. [1:63]
The financial risk associated with military aircraft
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manufacturers. Survival of a development program is
predicated all too often on the outcome of the many encounters
with the various steps in the budget cycle.
The commercial air transport industry has seen similar,
if not greater cost escalations in its flight equipment.
Despite lesser levels of technology required of transport
aircraft, due to the absence of advanced state-of-the-art
weapons fire-control and delivery systems required on
military aircraft, unit cost for today's typical wide-body
is in excess of 35 million dollars as compared to unit cost
of several hundred thousand dollars for the typical transport
of the 19 30s. Development costs for the current generation
of American-built wide-body transports has been a staggering
$1.0 to $1.5 billion for each design produced (B747, DC-10,
L-1011) . Such figures and the cash-flow typical of commercial
development programs as shown in Figure 5, clearly portrays
the nature of financial risk undertaken by the prime contrac-
tors, subcontractors, suppliers and the supporting banking
community.
The risk for the major manufacturers is centered on the
probability of recovering massive nonrecurring costs for air-
frame and propulsion system design, development, and Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) certification. Longer produc-
tion runs (larger sales volume) are now required to recover
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G. INCREASING ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSALS EXPENDITURES
Increasing aircraft complexity has precipitated yet
another trend, that of increasing expenditures for modifica-
tions to production military aircraft. These modifications
are a direct result of Engineering Change Proposal (ECP)
action by both the military user and the manufacturer.
Lacking statistical information concerning the number of ECP
actions, the Naval Weapons Engineering Support Activity
(NWESA) directed study efforts at financial expenditures for
modifications resulting from incorporating ECP in naval
aircraft. If the deviant behavior associated with the
Vietnam War is ignored, expenditures for ECP actions have
increased steadily since 1963. Through linear extrapolation,
NWESA projected ECP expenditure to $0.9 million and $1.4
million respectively per aircraft for 1985 and 1995 in 1977
dollars, an increase of 75% and 153% respectively over 1977
expenditures. [18:37]
H. ERA OF COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN
Rapid advancements in computer technology of the 1970s
has made possible rapid advancement of analytical and graphical
tools for computer-aided design (CAD) . Through interactive
software packages, it is no longer necessary to build hard-
ware prototypes to investigate performance, structures,
reliability, maintainability and cost. The designer is now
able to develop computer models of hardware solutions and
obtain visual animated answers to design questions.
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CAD has become an extremely complex process involving
interrelationships among design phases, design applications
and design functions. Just recently, interactive programs
for applying operational experience have been made available
to assist in the design function.
I. EMPHASIS ON SYSTEM OPTIMIZATION
History shows that systems performance has been the
traditional driving force behind military aircraft develop-
ment programs. This push for performance, almost to the
exclusion of all other system characteristics, has resulted
in tactical aircraft which have poor reliability and are
difficult and costly to maintain. These two factors, more
than any others, have resulted in unacceptable levels of
operational readiness and aircraft availability in fleet
operating units.
The air transport industry had long recognized the need
for an optimal balance between aircraft performance, relia-
bility, maintainability and life-cycle costs if they were to
remain a viable industry. By the late 1960s, the military
services, in view of rapidly growing operating and support
costs coupled with poor operational readiness, began
addressing design goals for systems optimization. Since the
early 1970s, major design emphasis has gone into reliability
and maintainability (R&M) for such optimization. R&M have
been acknowledged as primary life cycle cost "drivers" which
32

directly affect the operation and support costs for aircraft,
military and commercial, throughout their service lives.
J. CHANGING DoD SYSTEMS ACQUISITION POLICY
The military aerospace industry has been experiencing
yet another change during the past several years. In April
1976, the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) issued new
policies for the acquisition of major systems by all execu-
tive branch agencies. Essentially, the new policies, 0MB
Circular A-109, strive to assure effectiveness and effi-
ciency in the process of acquiring major systems. [19:3-4]
Policies thought to have significant DoD/Industry interface
in acquisition of future aircraft weapon systems are those
that direct the acquiring agency to:
1. Express needs and program objectives in mission
terms rather than specific capabilities or
equipment requirements to encourage innovation
and competition in operating, exploring and
developing alternative system design concepts;
2. Place emphasis on the initial activities of the
system acquisition process to allow competitive
exploration of alternative system design concepts
in response to mission needs; and
3. Rely on private industry for its needs for products
and services in accordance with the policy estab-
lished by 0MB circular A-76.
33

While A-109 may well improve the efficiencies associated
with aircraft acquisition schedule and cost, the benefits to
be derived by reducing the customer's and ultimate user's
role in system and subsystem design may detract from operator
service suitability. In the past, time-consuming reconcilia-
tion of opinions based on experience by operators,
NAVAIRSYSCOM Staffs, in-house Navy laboratories and industry
had a positive effect in the design decision making process.
Under A-109, utilization of operational experience is
questionable. The concept and approach to design will now
be developed competitively, using relatively short-term
contracts in response to solicitations which express
end-objective functions a bidding contractor's system must
perform. Contractors are forced by competition to follow
disciplined processes to deliver and justify their best
design proposals on a timely basis. [5:13]
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III. ROLE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
The basic trends encountered by aerospace design organi-
zations during the 1970s have been discussed in the previous
section of this study. Many of these trends are thought to
have a negative or deteriorating effect on aerospace design
capability. These trends, when coupled with a less than
optimum flow of operational experience from the user or
operator back to the front end of new hardware design, further
detract from design capability.
This section first investigates practical know-how as
the ingredient essential to good hardware design. It then
relates the importance of experience feedback as a means to
preserve aircraft design expertise in government and industry
new development programs.
A. THE DESIGN PROCESS
The design process consists of a hierarchical sequence,
beginning with ideas and concepts and ending with manufacturing
instructions and, if necessary, government product certifica-
tion. Within this sequence, hardware design correlates best
with the practical aspects of operational experience and is
the event that deserves most attention by this study. Haupt,




Within the constraints imposed by the chosen
configuration, - it is concerned with the actual
hardware of structures and systems. Alternative
solutions and tradeoffs have to be considered just
as in parametric studies — but now the practical
level of hardware replaces the abstract level of
parameters. Each component part is analyzed
from the separate viewpoints of function, strength,
cost, reliability, producibility , maintainability,
etc. Structural and functional tests may be
required for verification. The emphasis is on
engineering know-how.
Hardware design can also be thought of as a conversion
process — converting quantitative input requirements into
qualitative design solution outputs. Application of practical
know-how is the primary element in the conversion process.
Illustrative of the hardware design event in the design
process is the example shown in Figure 6. It portrays the
typical process in gross terms as applied to landing gear
design. The success or failure of hardware design in terms
of systems performance and life cycle costs is keyed to
designer know-how.
Know-how, ideally the blending of latest technology,
existing engineering knowledge and operational experience,
is what produces optimum hardware configuration. Of these
three forms of engineering design know-how, operational
experience can only be utilized through very close liaison
between designer and user shown in Figure 7. This is
perhaps the weakest link in the chain of design responsibility,
Theory indicates that this link is essential for optimal
hardware design. However, even where good liaison seems to
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that operational experience is not necessarily adopted
in new design. [4:10]
B. VALUE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
Build-up of design know-how in the area of operational
experience not only assists contractors in achieving a
competitive edge in the marketplace, but more importantly
benefits the customer by potentially maximizing measures of
systems effectiveness (i.e. operational readiness, aircraft
availability, reliability, maintainability) and minimizing
total life cycle costs. When compared to Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) aircraft development programs,
commercial aircraft development endeavors have historically
pursued more vigorously the utilization of operational
experience because of more cost-conscious airline customers.
In the past, systems performance has been the driving
force behind military aircraft development with little or
no regard for life cycle costs and systems effectiveness.
This emphasis on performance often displaced proven state-
of-the-art technology and operational experience for unproven
advanced technology. There was little need or incentive to
look back and learn from operational experiences. Penalties
have been excessive operating and support costs, and
unacceptable levels of operational readiness and aircraft
availability in fleet squadrons.
It has not been until recent times that military air-
craft design priorities have been re-directed to specifying
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required levels of achievement for systems effectiveness.
Most new development contracts now include incentive/penalty
clauses for systems effectiveness parameters. At minimum the
parameters express required levels of operational readiness,
aircraft availability, and major sub-system reliability and
maintainability
.
Systems effectiveness parameters to be achieved by the
aircraft weapons system are specified in quantitative terms.
It is then the designer's responsibility to convert the
specified quantitative requirements into qualitative hardware
design characteristics capable of meeting or exceeding the
specified requirements. To accomplish this task, designers
must draw very largely on past design knowledge.
C. THE EXPERIENCE GAP
The preferred method by which previous design knowledge
can be obtained is by first-hand experience from previous
hardware design assignments. Frequent new development starts
from post WWII until the mid 1950s provided much experience
for aeronautical designers of that time. The experience
build-up of that decade undoubtedly assisted many design
teams in creating better alternative solutions to design
problems in subsequent design efforts. Hopefully such
experience also avoided repetitive mistakes of previous
designs.
The most recent generation of aerospace design engineers
have not had similar opportunities for obtaining such
40

experience build-up and resultant knowledge. The average
level of design experience build-up achieved by the individual
engineer is steadily declining, a result of fewer program
starts and attrition of senior design engineers. Yet,
emphasis since the mid-1960s for improving life cycle costs
and system effectiveness compounded by increased systems
complexity has given cause to achieve a higher level of
experience build-up. Divergence between acquired and needed
levels of design experience build-up has been expanding the
experience gap, shown in Figure 8.
D. FEEDBACK FOR SHRINKING THE EXPERIENCE GAP
As early as 1971, Dr. John S. Forster, Jr., then Director
of Defense Research and Engineering, strongly expressed his
viewpoints to recreating and preserving design expertise in
government and industry. [21:21] Little has been accomplished
by the DoD over the ensuing years, in way of a unified
approach to restrain the growth in the experience gap and
preserve design expertise in military aircraft development
programs. Nevertheless, industry long recognizing the need
to find ways of obtaining operational experience, has been
taking progressive steps in developing suitable experience
feedback systems. [23:103]
In light of today's rapidly expanding computer informa-
tion processing capabilities, computer-aided engineering
design feedback systems can be made a reality. Such systems
could greatly assist in shrinking the experience gap.
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However, to achieve maximum benefit, the systems must be
formulated and developed to provide operational experience
information in a timely and meaningful user language format,
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IV. FEEDBACK OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
IN COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION
Apart from the past major technological breakthroughs
(turbojet engine, swept wing, high-by-pass fan engine, etc.)
the overall gain by the air transport industry has been
achieved by a large number of relatively small improvements
in numerous areas. Hence, technology advances have not
necessarily been stored and used all at once in a new design,
with all the attendant risks, but rather they have been
incorporated gradually in successive aircraft development
programs. [3:462] Many of the small improvements result
from the lessons learned in daily operations. Aerospace
contractors associated with the air transport industry find
feedback of operational experience from airline customers
essential for continued improvements in present production
and new development aircraft. Figure 9 illustrates the
several important information sources providing feedback
from the customer (ultimate user) to the manufacturer in the
commercial air transport industry. It should be noted that
contractor technical information systems and field service
representatives are internal or first level feedback sources,
while Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Air
































A. INTERNAL OR FIRST LEVEL SOURCES
1. Management Information Systems
One method by which aircraft contractors can maintain
liaison with the airline operators is via some form of a
Management Information System (MIS) . This is a centralized
system for providing information to support current opera-
tions, future aircraft development, program management,
and organizational decision-making functions.
Each of the three principal domestic transport air-
craft manufacturers has its own unique system. Lockheed-
California Company (LCC) will be taken as an example. Their
management information system, called Operational Support
Data System (OSDS) , has been providing feedback information
since 1969.
OSDS is essentially a closed loop information feed-
back system. At the time of its inception, its primary
purpose was to provide visibility to program management that
the L-1011 TriStar is performing to the required levels of
reliability, maintainability, safety and performance standard,
Responsibility for operation of the OSDS was assigned to
Lockheed's Commercial Product Support Center. Functions
of this center are listed in Figure 10, and include design
support. Commercial reliability and maintainability
responsibilities of the support center are spelled out in
Lockheed's Management Directive Number 162 contained in
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A lesser priority purpose of the now ten year old
OSDS was the feedback and build-up of design experience
information related to the L-1011 TriStar. The current
value of this information is now priceless in Lockheed's
on-going TriStar product improvement programs, L-1011
derivative development programs, and preliminary design
efforts for a TriStar replacement.
LCC employs OSDS in two ways — in everyday opera-
tions and in technical management decision-making. Design-
oriented functions are an important part of everyday
operations. As defined by Ein-Dor and Segev:
A management information system is a system for
collecting, storing, retrieving and processing
information that is used, or desired, by one or
more managers in the performance of their
duties. [6:16]
In view of this generally accepted definition of MIS, LCC '
s
OSDS can very well be titled, "A Technical Management
Information System (TMIS)".
a. Information Inputs
In the customer and contractor interface, feedback
emerges from one source only — the customer, as shown in
Figure 9. When considering the user and designer interface
within the respective customer and contractor organizations,
feedback emerges from a multitude of sources. Sources
include the contractor's test and evaluation activities, and
his subcontractors and suppliers for furnished equipment and
hardware. Four sources of feedback in LCC ' s OSDS are shown
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Source data can be made available in a variety
of forms, depending upon circumstances and agreements pre-
viously reached with the sources. Due to differences in
reporting capabilities and differences encountered in world
wide airline operations, vehicles for reporting must remain
flexible. Lockheed, for example, processes every kind of
input from text written on paper through automated data
processing punch cards and magnetic tapes
.
Standardization of source data inputs is most
important in standardization of the data bank baseline.
Quantitative data inputs such as aircraft utilization,
departure delays, maintenance cost, and the like, require
standardized measurement by all participating data sources.
Failure to do so will result in an unreliable and non-usable
output product. Lockheed reports that achieving uniformity
in reporting by all data feedback sources has been and
continues to be the greatest difficulty in their OSDS.
b. Information Processing ^
The major portion of a management information
system is concerned with collecting, reducing, storing,
retrieving, analyzing and disseminating information. The
aggregate of these activities can be termed information
processing. Lockheed chooses to call it data control.
Data control within Lockheed's OSDS is also the
responsibility of the Commercial Product Support Center.
As shown in Figure 11, the elements of data control conform




The type and number of MIS output products are
completely variable and limited only by source data and
processing software programs capabilities. However, if the
MIS is to be successful, the products must be compatible
with the needs and requirements of the users.
The output from Lockheed's OSDS comes in various
forms and covers a variety of subjects in reports tailored
to meet the requirements of L-1011 TriStar management tasks.
The output reports listed in Figure 11 are typical of the
periodic reports processed by OSDS. A representative sample
of output reports related to operational experience is
contained in Appendix C.
d. Information Applications
Among the criteria for determining a successful
from an unsuccessful MIS is how the output products are
applied. One condition for a successful MIS is that it be
applied to major problems of an organization. [6 :19-20]
Broadly speaking, OSDS programs provide the
necessary information for three areas of major concern:
First, keeping upper and operating management informed of
program performance status; second, establishing priorities
for directing product improvement; and third, providing
technical groups (product support and engineering) design
experience with fielded hardware. It is the third area that
is of concern in this study.
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Lockheed's OSDS finds definite application in
monitoring design deficiencies or problem areas as they show
up in airline operation. When a transport aircraft is unable
to meet a scheduled departure for technical reasons, it is
essential to have immediate feedback of engineering informa-
tion and to follow up with remedial action. The corresponding
organization is provided by Product Support. It is based
on availability of operational experience. [22:11]
A most important aircraft performance parameter
for airline operations is dispatch reliability. Dispatch
delays in excess of 15 minutes or flight cancellation are
closely monitored as to cause. Aircraft systems contributing
to dispatch delays or cancellations are monitored and reported
by OSDS. Standard reports, as shown in Figure 12, rank
system contribution by percent of total. Lockheed's effort
to improve L-1011 dispatch reliability serves as an example
of OSDS design support application in both special studies
and tackling in-service technical problems.
Using OSDS data bank information, subsequent
special studies are undertaken to define the problem and
identify the problem component. After the component has
been identified, in-depth and detailed studies follow to
determine component failure item and cause of failure.
These data and information are then transferred from the
OSDS operations group to program engineering. Engineering
deteinnines the "why" of failure and develops a new or
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2 . Field Service Representatives
Since the days of the Wright Flyer, a vital link
between the contractor and his customers has been the Field
Service Representative, often better known as the "Tech-Rep."
In the early days, Tech-Reps were just what the name implied —
Technical Representatives. However, in today's environment,
they provide a host of administrative as well as technical
services. Services are rendered to both their employer and
customer.
The vast majority of data inputs for technical
management information systems, such as Lockheed's Operational
Support Data System, are generated by Field Service Representa-
tives. L-1011 TriStar field reports generated for inclusion
in the OSDS are found in Table I. Volume of communications
traffic associated with these reports from 19 field offices
(11 American and 8 International) is shown in Figure 13.
Field Service Representatives are also the contractor's
eyes and ears. Aside from the mundane tasks of providing
technical and administrative assistance to both their employer
and customer. Field Service Representatives are in a position
to compile competitive business intelligence.
The intelligence function in business is recognized
by many competitive corporations as one of the keys for
successful strategic planning and decision making by top
management. [26:2] Intelligence gathering by Field Service
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intelligence assemination, and should be considered confined
to areas of technical interest.
Areas of technical interest include monitoring the
performance characteristics of competitor equipment, observing
airline operator likes and dislikes in both equipment being
represented and competitor equipment, and identifying
desirable features in operator's future equipment needs.
Feedback and utilization of such intelligence can be of great
assistance in directing design strategy to be taken in new
aircraft developments, and in tailoring future equipment to
the airline operator needs and environment.
B. EXTERNAL OR SECOND LEVEL SOURCES
1. Air Transport Association of America (ATA)
The ATA is a membership organization serving the many
needs of U.S. flag air carriers. While ATA's emphasis in
support of air carrier needs is on federal regulatory affairs,
it also provides engineering and maintenance services. Of
interest are its engineering and maintenance activities keyed
to aircraft design standardization in areas of ground
servicing and maintenance, technical information index
standardization, technical problems conferences, and developing
the industry's position on Federal Aviation Administration
proposed rule making. The unified position on technical
issues voiced by the ATA for the air transport industry has
definite influential impact on federal air regulation rule
making and contractor response to in-service equipment
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problems as well as future derivative or next generation
aircraft design characteristics and features.
The feedback of design or technical information from
the airline operators to the contractor's design engineering
team via the ATA is shown in Figure 9 and is external to
normal channels employed by the contractor. Information
feedback of this type is primarily generated by "as the need
arises" or "on-exception" basis.
2. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) , an agency
of the Department of Transportation, has comprehensive
authority over air safety and control over all U.S. airspace.
FAA's technical responsibilities in the air transport industry
include: establishing and maintaining Federal Air Regulations
related to requirements for aircraft design and construction;
aircraft airworthiness certification; monitoring health of
aircraft fleets; approving major engineering changes and
alterations to civil aircraft; and issuing airworthiness
directives for mandating action required by contractors and
operators for sustaining aircraft airworthiness. FAA air-
carrier field office activities at airline main-base of
operations and mandatory airline reporting of equipment
defects or failures adversely affecting flight safety are
the primary sources of information feedback.
The flow of information, like that of the ATA, is
external to the regular or normal channels employed by the
58

contractor and it too is predicated on "as the need arises"
or an "on-exception" basis.
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V. FEEDBACK OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
IN NAVAL AVIATION
Excluding military avionics systems, technology advances
in applied military aerospace technology have historically
been the "pathfinders" for the entire aerospace industry.
In the past, the push for superior preformance requirements
in military programs contrasted sharply with life-cycle
costs and systems effectiveness objectives of the air
transport industry. Changes in Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIRSYSCOM) acquisition policy have placed increased
emphasis on life-cycle costs and systems effectiveness.
Despite efforts to improve weapon system acquisition
efficiency and effectiveness through a pyramid of ever-
changing program management policies and directives, the
single most dominant factor governing life-cycle costs and
systems effectiveness relates to operational experience.
A clearly established system for feeding back operational
experience to the designer can greatly assist aircraft
contractors in achieving NAVAIRSYSCOM aircraft design
objectives
.
A. CONTRACTOR INFORMATION FEEDBACK SOURCES
Figure 14 portrays the primary sources of feedback from
the Navy user to the prime contractor. Although information
feedback sources closely resemble sources in commercial





information flow. The differences are largely a result of
decentralized information collection, storage, retrieval,
analysis and application.
In military aircraft programs, little emphasis has been
placed on systematic evaluation of experience until recently.
There are several reasons for this. First, with roughly
10 major aircraft manufacturers (fixed and rotor wing)
competing for less than half as many development contracts
in a given 10 year span, there is only remote probability
in favor of landing a development contract as prime
contractor. Under such odds, little incentive exists to
develop and maintain a feedback capability and data bank,
especially when sustaining engineering funds are not pro-
vided by NAVAIRSYSCOM. Contrary to the airline operator's
farsighted procurement policy, military services depend on
yearly approvals of a Congressional budget. This has had
an adverse effect on the long-range funding required for a
feedback system. There are, however, signs for improvements
in the future. A second reason stems from industry competi-
tion differences between military and commercial aircraft
procurement. Compared to military sole-source procurements,
the airlines are at liberty to choose from a variety of
similar and competing aircraft. To hopefully gain a
competitive edge in commercial programs, a contractor will




From Figure 14, the only internal or first level feedback
source available to the contractor is through his field
service representatives
. Three of the remaining four sources
are external or second level and one source is direct from
NAVAIRSYSCOM
.
1. Internal or First Level Sources
Since the fledgling days of military aviation,
contractor field service representatives have provided the
armed forces invaluable technical services. Their technical
assistance to improve the technical expertise of military
maintainers has had a positive impact on achieving operational
readiness goals and is considered one of their primary roles.
Another primary role pertains to monitoring performance and
systems effectiveness of the aircraft weapon system they
represent.
Significant technical problems or discrepancies
encountered are reported via numerous modes of communication.
Contractor utilization of such feedback data is usually
confined to resolving current product problems and product
improvement, whereas in commercial programs, such data would
also be utilized in future derivative or new development
projects.
In the late 1960s, the Naval Aviation Engineering
Services Unit (NAESU) sought self-sufficiency for the Navy
during the latter phase of the aircraft life-cycle coupled
with the desire to reduce expenditures for contractor
sustaining engineering. The result was creation of the
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Contractor Engineering Technical Services (GETS) and Navy
Engineering Technical Services (NETS) programs.
Under the CETS/NETS concept, contractor field-service
representatives assigned to fleet operating units are fewer
in number and are providing technical services for a much
shorter period of time. What was once a "cradle-to-grave"
field-service support program by the contractor has been
reduced to only a fraction of the weapons system life cycle.
The effect on the contractors has been a sizable
reduction in feedback of internally generated or first level
design experience information. The end result is undoubtedly
contributing to the problem of maintaining contractor design
team capability.
2 . External or Second Level Sources
a. Navy Maintenance Support Office
An excellent source of operational experience
data is provided by the Navy Maintenance Support Office (NAMSO)
of the Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO) . Designed,
developed and operated to provide maintenance and maintenance
support data to all levels of Navy management, NAMSO 's wealth
of analytical and statistical products are available to all
authorized research and development contractors.
Shown in Figure 14 is NAMSO ' s fit into the
feedback flow pattern, between the user and contractor. Its
input, processing and output functions are similar to




(1) Information Inputs . Information feedback
for NAMSO emerges from basically two sources — fleet aviation
activities and NAVAIRSYSCOM research, development, test and
evaluation field activities. Information is accumulated by
the Maintenance Data Collection Subsystem (MDCS) which is
an integral part of the Navy Maintenance, Material and Man-
power Management System, more commonly known as the Navy
3-M system. The 3-M system is sponsored by the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) and technically supported by the
Chief of Naval Material and the Naval Air Systems Command.
Source data is made available only in the
type and format previously approved by CNO in OPNAV
Instruction 4790.2. Changes in data type or format desired
by MSO must be approved by CNO. The rather inflexible
system does, however, have the advantage of being a stabi-
lized and standardized Navy-wide computerized data baseline.
The problem of data reduction to achieve a standardized
data base as experienced by commercial programs is totally
eliminated in the 3-M system.
Types of quantitative source data reported
by the 3-M system and collected by MDCS, applicable to
operational experience, were found to be almost identical
to Lockheed's commercial data source inputs for their OSDS
listed in Figure 11. Such 3-M data include:
— MDR (Maintenance Data Reporting)
;
— MR (Material Reporting) ; and
— ASD (Aircraft Statistical Data) reporting.
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(2) Information Processing . Information
processing of 3-M data by NAMSO is that typical of most
information processing activities — storing, retrieving,
analyzing and disseminating information.
(3) Output Products . NAMSO output products
are numerous and users of the numerous products are many.
The products take the form of standard reports and summaries,
and special requests. Products of interest to both the
contractors and the NAVAIRSYSCOM systems engineering group
and related to aircraft weapon system design experience are
contained in Appendix D.
(4) Information Application . NAMSO output
products serve a host of applications. Similar to commercial
program Technical Management Information Systems (TMIS)
,
NAMSO serves contractor and Navy management needs in three
broad areas: tracking weapon system performance trends in
terms of readiness and utilization; establishing priorities
for service problem and deficiency correction; and providing
technical groups information for utilization in product
improvement and new design development programs. Unlike
commercial program information systems, which are designed
and operated solely for parent company application, NAMSO
serves the entire military aircraft manufacturing industry
and naval aviation management structure.
NAMSO output products, quantitative and
statistical in nature, find extensive application in the
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area of weapon system effectiveness. The recent Chief of
Naval Material and Naval Air Systems Command push to bring
about increased operational readiness and reduced life cycle
cost in Naval aircraft acquisition has given cause to improve
system reliability and maintainability (R&M) . In response to
this push, NAVAIRSYSCOM and aircraft contractors have looked
to NAMSO for historical statistical data such that R&M
requirements and allocations can be better predicted during
the early phases of the acquisition process.
b. Test and Evaluation
Test and Evaluation (T&E) is a vital function
in aircraft weapon system acquisition. Starting with initial
research and development, T&E is an integral and continuing
part of the acquisition process. Essentially, the purpose
of T&E is a determination of the suitability of hardware
for service use. If the hardware functions in a technically
acceptable manner and if the hardware meets the specified
operational performance requirements the hardware is con-
sidered suitable for service use. [16:27] Test and evalua-
tion identifies design deficiencies and enhancing character-
istics. Thus, it provides feedback to design teams and
program management for the contractor and Navy alike.
(1) The Process . Test and evaluation of a
typical current generation tactical aircraft is a long and
tedious process, often spanning six or more years. The
process begins shortly after the first flight with the first




. The last NPE is conducted just prior
to the Board of Inspection and Survey (BIS) trials.
The purpose of an NPE is to: [11:19]
— Determine at the earliest possible
opportunity the combat potential and
gross deficiencies of the aircraft
and its systems, and
— Allow early correction of deficiencies.
Following the NPEs, the BIS trials are
commenced to determine service suitability and contractor
specification conformance in production configured aircraft.
All discrepancies reported during the NPEs and BIS trials
must be corrected or otherwise resolved before the aircraft
is considered service suitable.
Follow-on T&E is conducted after the air-
craft is delivered to fleet operating activities. The
majority of this effort is confined to engineering change
proposal actions, accelerated service testing, assistance
in derivative development, and operating problems encountered
by fleet activities.
(2) Reporting Results . T&E reporting provides
feedback as shown in Figure 14. The Naval Air Test Center
(NAVAIRTESTCEN) , chartered as the Navy's field activity for
aircraft weapons system T&E, utilizes five basic report
types for reporting T&E results. The reports include:




— Deficiency Report (DR)
;
— Formal Technical Report (TR)
;
— Report of Test Results (RTR) ; and
— Message Report.
A detailed description of these reports is found in Table
II. With the exception of the BIS Yellow Sheet and
NAVAIRTESTCEN Deficiency Report which are confined to
deficiency reporting only, aircraft enhancing characteristics
as well as deficiencies are reported.
(a) Enhancing Characteristics. Those
characteristics of the aircraft or equipment which signifi-
cantly enhance its operational use or technical capability
are numerated in the report. The characteristics listed
emphasize the significant strong points or capabilities and
provide the contractor and Navy program manager with the
good side of the picture. More importantly for design
experience information feedback, it acknowledges outstanding
characteristics which should be incorporated into future new
development program designs and specifications.
(b) Deficiency Classification. Deficiencies
identified during the course of T&E are fully qualified in
the text of the applicable T&E report. In order to differ-
entiate a more serious deficiency from a less serious one,
the Naval Air Test Center classifies each deficiency.




TYPES OF NAVAL AIR TEST CENTER
T&E REPORTS
1. BIS Yellow Sheet (Y/S) . This is the means for reporting
deficiencies noted during Board of Inspection and Survey
(BIS) trials. The report by its nature requires rapid
transfer of information, and as such, each deficiency is
reported separately on its own report format.
2. Deficiency Report (PR) . This is the means for reporting
deficiencies noted during Navy preliminary evaluations
(NPE) . The report by its nature requires rapid transfer
of information, and as such, each deficiency is reported
separately on its own report.
3. Formal Technical Report (TR) . This is the primary means
for documenting the results of project work. This report
is used when the reported results will be significant for
a long period of time, will be widely distributed (i.e.
Defense Documentation Center) or have other important
aspects which require the report to have lasting value.
4. Report of Test Results (RTR) . This is the means for
reporting information which is limited in scope,
application or time. It is usually used for reporting
interim results of any project when relatively short
periods of time or minor sections of test are involved.
5. Message Report . This is the means for reporting informa-
tion that is of an urgent nature. It is used for
reporting results of limited scope evaluation phases or
preliminary summary results of large scope evaluations/
evaluation phases.




CLASSIFICATION OF DEFICIENCIES BY THE
NAVAL AIR TEST CENTER
1. Part I
a. Airworthiness of the aircraft.
b. The ability of the aircraft (or piece of equipment)
to accomplish its primary or secondary mission
(or intended use)
.
c. The effectiveness of the crew as an essential subsystem.
d. The safety of the crew or the integrity of an essential
subsystem. In this regard, a real likelihood of injury
or damage must exist. Remote possibilities or
unlikely sequences of events shall not be used as a
basis for safety items.
A Part I deficiency is the most serious category in which a
deficiency can be placed. It indicates an unsatisfactory
characteristic. The criteria to be used in determining
whether or not a deficiency is a Part I deficiency is to ask
the question, can the aircraft or piece of equipment accomplish
its mission with a satisfactory degree of safety and effective-
ness? If not, then a Part I deficiency exists.
2. Part II indicates a deficiency of lesser severity than a
Part I which does not substantially reduce the ability of the
aircraft or piece of equipment to accomplish its primary or
secondary mission, but the correction of which will result in
significant improvement in the effectiveness, reliability,
maintainability, or safety of the aircraft or equipment. A
Part II deficiency is a deficiency which either degrades the
capabilities of the equipment or requires significant operator
compensation to achieve the desired level of performance;
however, the aircraft or equipment being tested is still
capable of accomplishing its mission with a satisfactory
degree of safety and effectiveness.
3. Part III indicates a deficiency which is minor or slightly
unpleasant or appears too impractical or uneconomical to
correct in this model, but should be avoided in future
designs
.
Source: Naval Air Test Center
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categories: Part I, Part II, or Part III. Table III
outlines the criteria for deficiency classification.
A Part I deficiency, the most serious
of the three must be corrected as garly as "prior to
further flying" or as late as "soon as possible, but not
to interfere with development." A Part II deficiency is to
be corrected "as soon as practicable." Lastly, the least
serious Part III deficiency is "to be avoided in future
designs." [14:111-27]
A breakdown of deficiencies reported
in previous NPEs and BIS trials pertaining to recent aircraft
development programs is contained in Table IV. By far, the
most frequently reported deficiency is classified as Part II.
(3) Report Release and Distribution . Release
and distribution of NAVAIRTESTCEN and BIS reports is limited
to U.S. government agencies only. Requests for reports from
other interested parties must be directed to either the
NAVAIRTESTCEN or the Sub-Board of Inspection and Survey.
Normal distribution of reports will include:
— Cognizant NAVAIRSYSCOM Program Manager
for Acquisition (PMA)
;
— Cognizant NAVAIRSYSCOM Class Desk
Officer;
— Cognizant NAVPRO/DCAS/APPRO; and
— Applicable NAVAIRSYSCOM Systems
Engineering Technical Division.
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via hard-copy. Only the Defense Documentation Center (DDC)
makes copy available in microfiche, and the reports available
are limited to NAVAIRTESTCEN DRs , TRs , and RTRs
.
c. Naval Safety Center
While not playing a major role in volume of
experience feedback, the Safety Center does provide vital
feedback related to flight and maintenance operations
safety. Similar to the reporting requirements imposed upon
the commercial airlines by the Federal Avaiation Administra-
tion, information input into the Safety Center is in the
form of mandatory reporting by fleet operating units. Such
inputs include safety unsatisfactory material/condition
reports, aircraft incident reports, aircraft accident
reports, and the like.
The Safety Center does their own in-house data
compilation, processing, and analysis. Many of the output
products assist NAVAIRSYSCOM and contractor design teams in
the elimination of undesirable safety characteristics from
existing aircraft systems and future new development designs.
d. Direct Reporting by NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
Yet another source of external or second level
information is made available to the prime contractors.
The Program Management (PM) Office and the cognizant tech-
nical divisions are sources in the NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ reporting
directly to the contractor. See Figure 14.
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During the full scale engineering development
phase of aircraft weapon system acquisition, several events
take place under the jurisdiction of the PM that are of
significant value to contractor design teams. These events
include the full-scale engineering mock-up review, maintenance
mock-up review, engineering design reviews and integrated
logistic support management team meetings. The objectives
of these efforts are two-fold: First, to identify design
suitability problem areas as early as possible so immediate
corrective action will minimize the adverse impact of cost,
schedule and weight; and second, with the combined efforts
of Navy and contractor supportability personnel, to develop
the best possible fleet deployment support package.
After the aircraft enters production and is
deployed with fleet operating units, a Naval Air Rework
Facility (NARF) is assigned as the cognizant Field Activity
(CFA) for engineering support of the aircraft. From that time
on, until the aircraft is retired from service, the NARF and
aircraft contractor can be expected to have intensive engi-
neering ties. Engineering investigations, product improvements
and service life extension programs require in-depth engineer-
ing study. Engineering studies of this type provide a wealth
of invaluable information.
B. RDT&E FEEDBACK LOOP ACTION GENERATION SYSTEM
1 . Background
NAVAIRTESTCEN Deficiency Reports (DR) , Board of
Inspection and Survey (BIS) Yellow Sheets (Y/S) , and other
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T&E reports discussed previously are the official means by
which aircraft design deficiencies, specification violations
and/or failures in equipment are identified. Traditionally,
these reports have been used by cognizant NAVAIRSYSCOM and
contractor program management personnel for resolving serious
deficiencies associated with the specific weapon system under-
going T&E. The reported deficiencies and their solutions are
generally confined to the program manager and his technical
staff. The "lessons learned" are seldom applied to new
development programs or made available to industry design
teams as feedback for previous design experience.
Recognizing the opportunity to expand the potential
utilization of T&E deficiency data, the Air Crew Systems
Division (AIR-531) of NAVAIRSYSCOM launched a program in 1974
to develop a mechanized BIS Y/S tracking system related to
air crew aspects of aircraft weapon systems. Among the
advantages offered by the system are: [13:4]
— Greater consistency in the processing and
application of Y/S data;
— Prediction of potential problems in aircraft
weapon systems entering development; and
— Identification of technology problems for input
into the R&D and training communities.
A follow-on effort, the RDT&E Feedback Loop Action
Generation System (FLAGS) was undertaken in 197 6 to expand and
refine the BIS Y/S tracking system. As a result, FLAGS is
capable of providing deficiency status reports, narrative
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summary reports, statistical compilations, and the correlation





FLAGS has been designed to facilitate the storage and
processing of statistical (quantitative) and narrative (quali-
tative) information. Most important in this area is the sys-
tem's capability to store and process aircraft system, sub-
system, and component deficiency data resulting from mock-up
reviews, design reviews, maintenance mock-up reviews, Navy
Preliminary Evaluation (NPE) , Board of Inspection and Survey
(BIS) trials and Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
engineering investigations.
The aggregate of these individual technical informa-
tions under one system (a NAVAIR corporate memory for previous
design experience) and the ability to easily retrieve user
information, has satisfied most of the FLAGS objectives.
Those objectives thought to have significance related to
identifying and applying previous design experience are
listed in Table V.
3. Information Retrieval
Retrieval of information from the FLAGS data base is
limited only by the amount and the type of information stored
in the data base. A simplified flow from user data query to
output product is shown in Figure 15.
Information retrieval is initiated by completing a




OBJECTIVES OF THE FEEDBACK LOOP
ACTION GENERATION SYSTEM (FLAGS)
1. Providing rapid retrieval of NPE/BIS deficiency data in
simple format.
2. Printing out selective, detailed deficiency reports to
facilitate specific management decisions.
3. Indicating "avoid in future design" deficiencies.
4. Associating T&E deficiency data rapidly with Mil-Specs/
Stds for updates and follow-on buys.
4. Identifying complex, recurring deficiencies for research
and technology assistance.
6. Contributing to R&D requirements definition.
7. Permitting statistical manipulations across deficiency
base to compile suiranary statistics on critical issues.
8. Enabling flexible access to technical data and informa-
tion across past weapon system deficiencies for
correlation with new deficiencies.
9. Relating system development data (program, design,
mock-up decisions) to contractor demo data, NPE, BIS,
OPEVAL and fleet gripes.
10. Providing research by specific technical keywords,
acronyms, work unit-codes and unsatisfactory reports.
SOURCE: NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND (AIR- 531)
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as a guide to the retrieval criteria. The request is then
processed by the NAVAIRSYSCOM computer facility. Retrieval
results in a computer printout tailored to the specific
requirements on the retrieval request form. Figure 16
illustrates a typical user query and output product.
More detailed examples of retrieval requests and
output products are found in Appendix E. The many advantages
of FLAGS are found in Table VI.
C. GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY DATA EXCHANGE PROGRAM
1. Background
The Government- Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP)
chartered in 1970 became the scheme to consolidate the then
existing Tri-Service Interagency Data Exchange Program (IDEP)
Under this new scheme, the Chief of Naval Material was desig-
nated by the Joint Logistics Commanders to exercise over-all
responsibility for GIDEP.
Essentially, GIDEP is a cooperative activity between
government and industry participants seeking to conserve
time, personnel and money by making maximum use of existing
experience and knowledge. The program provides a means to
automatically exchange a multitude of different types of
technical information essential in the research, design,
development, T&E, production and operational phases of the
life cycle of aircraft weapon systems. [9:1-1] To accom-
plish this task, GIDEP is concerned with the acquisition,
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Program Objectives and Policy
Identified GIDEP objectives relevant to design are
listed in Table VII.
All activities of the Naval Material Command directly
engaged in the research, design, development, testing and
production of mission-related Navy material are required to
participate in GIDEP. Furthermore, all Navy-funded contracts
for research, design, development, testing, and production
of mission-related Navy material wherein the contract amount
exceeds $100,000, shall require contractor participation




GIDEP emphasis has been placed upon the rapid trans-
mission of information to potential users, and upon having
the information rapidly available upon demand. A highly
simplified illustration of input and output information flow
is found in Figure 17. A data retrieval system developed by
GIDEP allows rapid accessibility to microfilmed information
in the data bank, either through hard copy indexes or by access
to the GIDEP operation center's computer data system via a
remote computer terminal.
GIDEP places primary emphasis on data generated by
users rather than contractors. Government specifications,
contractor proprietary data and classified information are




OBJECTIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT-
INDUSTRY DATA EXCHANGE PROGRAM (GIDEP
1. Reduce or eliminate duplicative expenditures for the
testing of parts, components and materials.
2. Increase system reliability.
3. Provide advance notification of possible part,
component and material failures or potential
problem areas.
4. Promote standard procedures for reporting test
information.
5. Facilitate communication among scientific and
technical personnel working on related programs.
6. Provide a source of general parts, components and
materials test data during research, development
and other stages of the procurement cycle.
7. Provide failure rate and mode data to assist in
design, reliability and logistics functions.
8. Provide a failure experience data bank on parts,
components and materials to identify defective/
suspect items, facilitate their removal from
stock and preclude their reentry into new equipment
designs
.
9. Provide for the transfer of technology to American
industry in the interest of the national economy.
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4. Data Banks
Participants in the program are provided access to
four major data banks. [9:1-5]
a. Engineering Data Bank
This bank contains engineering evaluation and
qualification tests reports, nonstandard parts justification
data, parts and materials specifications, manufacturing pro-
cesses, failure analysis data, and other related engineering
data on parts, components, materials, and processes.
b. Metrology Data Bank
This bank contains related metrology engineering
data on test systems, calibration systems, and measurement
technology and test equipment calibration procedures, and
has been designated as a data repository for the National
Bureau of Standards (NBS) metrology related data.
c. Failure Experience Data Bank
This bank contains objective failure information
generated when significant problems are identified on parts,
components, processses, fluids, materials, or safety and
fire hazards. This data bank includes the ALERT and SAF-
ALERT system and failure analysis information.
d. Reliability and Maintainability Data Bank
This bank contains failure rate/mode and replace-
ment rate data on parts and components based on field per-
formance information and/or reliability demonstration tests
of equipment, subsystems and systems. The data bank also
contains reports on theories, methods, techniques, and




Participation in GIDEP has shown steady growth in
recent years. The total number of participating government
and industry activities has grown from 407 in 1974 to 554 in
1978. Documentation activity has shown a five-fold increase.
Documents received (input) increased from 3,325 in 1974
to 15,257 in 1978, and documents processed increased from
3,301 in 1974 to 17,452 in 1978. [7] Design engineers,
reliability and maintainability engineers, and logisticians
alike, are utilizing GIDEP information to expedite and improve
their decision-making process. Forms of information, groups
utilizing the information and the perceived value of such




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































VI. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Previous sections of this study have explored the various
sources of operational experience information in commercial
and military aircraft programs. These same sections also
addressed the methods employed in the flow of such informa-
tion back to the contractor and his product support and
design engineering personnel. This section summarizes the
more important findings made during study of the commercial
and military feedback process.
A. MOTIVATION FOR FEEDBACK
The most apparent difference between commercial and mili-
tary programs for operational experience feedback is economic
motivation. Economic motivation provides catalytic action
for commercial program but is not found as critical within
military programs. To remain competitive in the commercial
marketplace for additional sales of an existing aircraft model,
and to achieve a favorable reputation for future sales of a
new development aircraft, contractors rely heavily on "lessons
learned" from operational experience. These lessons have been
expressed and substantiated in terms of cost effectiveness
by airlines for a long time. Military services have been
fully aware of life-cycle costs only for a short time and the




Navy Acquisition and Fleet operating practices too
often preclude the contractor from adequately monitoring
his deployed products. The vast majority of experience
feedback to the contractor is via a feedback system external to
his organization. Many specific data needs desired by the
contractor are not obtainable from Navy sources. This will
necessarily influence the contractor's motivation regarding
feedback.
Navy and contractor information feedback systems differ
in philosophy. The latter recognizes at all corporate
management levels that dispatch reliability is influenced by
operations and environment; that it is essential to monitor
operational reliability. Consequently, contractor Technical
Management Information Systems (TMIS) or operational support
system data bases are drive by reliability programs. These
programs in turn, drive technical advancement programs for
product improvement and new design development.
The principal Navy information feedback system, its
Maintenance, Material and Manpower Management System (3-M)
was not conceived as a reliability monitoring system. Rather,
the 3-M system was conceived as a manpower and material
management system. Since 1965, the 3-M system has gradually
attained a reliability orientation; however, pending a change
in policy and system design, 3-M remains primarily a Main-
tenance, Material and Manpower Management feedback system.
Contractor TMIS and the Navy's 3-M system have evolved
as mechanized systems to provide for mass-processing of
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generated data into usable information. Nevertheless, both
systems exhibit definite differences attributable to feedback
motivation differences. Table IX summarizes the major
differences.
B. ACCESS TO FEEDBACK INFORMATION
Contractor access to the numerous sources of feedback
information varies widely. Access to information generated
external to the contractor's organization is often difficult
if not impossible. The weakest link in the external informa-
tion feedback loop is in the area of qualitative design-
oriented experience. The reasons appear to be a combination
of two factors — the proprietary nature and the fragmented
control of such information.
1. Proprietary Information
Experience evolving from full-scale engineering develop-
ment supplements experience subsequently obtained during ser-
vice use by operating activities. Information and experi-
ence generated during development is of immense value to
aircraft design teams in that it serves not only in making
early corrections to existing system discrepancies but more
importantly in providing "lessons learned" to avoid identical
or similar problems from reoccurring in subsequent design
efforts.
Navy acquisition policies and practices honor develop-
ment experience generated in-house as proprietary information.
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actions, and test and evaluation results. Development
information access is limited to U.S. government agency
and cognizant development contractor use only. Access
or transfer of this information to other contractors
within the aerospace industry is not practiced.
The industry faces a similar situation in commer-
cial aircraft development programs. The intense competi-
tive nature for aircraft sales to the world's airlines inhibits
transfer of current and previous experience among competing
contractors.
2 . Fragmented Sources
Major manufacturers of transport aircraft have each
developed a corporate memory regarding their previous pro-
ducts. Statistical (quantitative) and narrative (quali-
tative) information is normally contained in a technical
management information system (TMIS) operated by either a
commercial product support or a corporate experience reten-
tion group. Centralized information control is the key
for ready access.
For Navy programs, integration efforts directed at
developing a centralized data bank for Navy-wide design and
operational experience have been minimal. Instead, a number
of individually sponsored feedback systems serving the
specific needs of the sponsor have sprouted during recent
years.
A contractor must now weave his way through a multi-
tude of fragmented Navy sources to recover development, test
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and evaluation, and fleet operation experience. Recovery
efforts from this extensive and fragmented data base are
often time consiiming and usually result in information that
is difficult to correlate into terms meaningful to contractor
design engineering teams.
As shown in Section V, B and C, FLAGS and GIDEP have
been introduced by the Navy to provide narrative or quali-
tative experience information (i.e., T&E report results, design
review chits, mock-up review chits, etc.). They complement
the 3-M system which provides operational statistical or
quantitative data from operational units as described in
Section V.A.2. Basically, FLAGS and GIDEP systematize
existing Navy data sources into a computerized data and informa-
tion base peculiar to the needs of the two systems. Entry
into these storage and feedback information systems is accom-
plished via specific technical keywords, acronyms, and
work unit codes that are kin to the aerospace design engin-
eering community. Entry is limited only by the degree of
system software flexibility.
Each of the three feedback systems is under separate
sponsorship and funding — FLAGS with the Naval Air Systems
Command, GIDEP with the Naval Material Command, and 3-M
with the Chief of Naval Operations.
C. QUICKNESS OF INFORMATION FEEDBACK AND RETRIEVAL
Information on operational experience must be quickly
retrievable to be of value. The air transport industry has
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long recognized the importance of expediency in feedback of
operational experience to the manufacturers for correction
of flight equipment problems. Management emphasis on expedi-
ency is evident by world-wide real-time communication networks
with field feedback sources. Operations of this type are
for the most part, indirectly financed by the airline
customers who find such investments highly cost-effective
in reducing lost revenue caused by delayed or grounded
aircraft.
Navy feedback sources are less responsive. Often, during
the dynamics of full-scale engineering development, Navy T&E
feedback is too late to affect the program's original design
decision. Also, the receipt of Navy T&E results by the pro-
curing activity has the effect of seeming to put NAVAIRSYSCOM
personnel "on report." A defensive attitude on the part of
the program manager and his technical team inevitably results.
Instead of being a tool for the acquisition and fielding of
the best aircraft weapons system possible, T&E feedback tends
to embarrass the program management and technical team,
thereby, suppressing feedback of badly needed design experi-
ence to contractor design teams.
Utilization of information on operational experience by
designers during the design process on new development pro-
grams is time-critical. To be of value, designers must have
the information when needed — preferably via a remote CRT
terminal and within easy reach.
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FLAGS and GIDEP have the capability of improving the
situation in favor of more responsive feedback and information
retrieval. Both systems mechanize the data base which in
today's environment has grown so that it is too extensive for
unaided manual handling. Data inputs come directly from the
source, thereby streamlining the existing manual process and
minimizing feedback delays. Output products are available
in both hard copy or through on- location CRT terminals.
D. APPLICATION OF FEEDBACK INFORMATION
In commercial aircraft programs, operational experience
is greatly emphasized and a centralized feedback system has
been developed. Information revealing product deficiencies
is immediately applied to current programs for product
improvement. Equally important, deficiencies serve as
"lessons learned" for avoiding recurring or similar problems
in new development programs. Experience with enhancing
design features from past products is also applied to new
development programs. Such features can substantially con-
tribute to improved performance and effectiveness compared to
previous products.
In Navy programs, with the exception of 3-M data, feedback
is predominantly applied to solving the most visible aspects
of the "now" problems associated with individual aircraft or
equipment subsystems. Little incentive exists to apply this
feedback information to new development programs, partly due
to different priorities for Navy program managers, and partly
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due to Navy acquisition policy and practices which seldom
provide the necessary funding.
The Navy 3-M data bank is made available to all defense
contractors. Currently, it provides only statistical (quan-
titative) information pertaining to aeronautical maintenance,
material, and manpower on all Navy aircraft. Extensive
application for 3-M is in the area of systems effectiveness.
Contractors rely on 3-M data for system reliability and
maintainability prediction and allocation.
FLAGS and GIDEP have both been experiencing recent growth
in utilization. The founder of FLAGS, the Aircrew Systems
Division (AIR-531) of the NAVAIRSYSCOM, has also been its
chief user. Since its inception in the mid 1970s, FLAGS has
been employed as a means for tracking air crew systems
deficiencies in Naval aircraft development programs.
Recently, FLAGS has found application to the F-18 air-
craft weapon system development program. In January of
19 78, the NAVAIRTESTCEN highlighted the need for an automated
system of tracking F-18 deficiency reports. The intent of
FLAGS application in this program as discussed in Appendix
F, is to derive better administrative control and manage-
ment action of deficiency reports. Once again, feedback empha-
sis is being directed at the immediate need for improving
program administrative and management functions. Little
emphasis has been directed at building an experience infor-
mation base for utilization by design teams in avoiding
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similar or recurring problems in future Naval aircraft
development programs
.
As previously discussed in Section V, GIDEP utiliza-
tion and fields of application have increased markedly
since 1974. Breakdown of GIDEP utilization is roughly 75
percent industry and 2 5 percent government. Payoff for users
of GIDEP is estimated at fourteen dollars recovered for
every dollar spent. Despite recent growth in the number of
participants and frequency of activity by both the industry
and the government, the NAVAIRSYSCOM and its RDT&E field
activities have taken little advantage of the services and





ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED AND INTERVIEWED
Organizations contacted and interviewed during the
course of this study include the following:
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Navy Maintenance Support Office
Government- Indus try Data Exchange Program, Operations
Center
Naval Air Rework Facility, North Island
Naval Air Systems Command
Naval Air Test Center
Naval Aviation Logistics Center
Naval Material Command
Sub-Board of Inspection and Survey, Patuxent River
AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
Air Transport Association of America
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company







LOCKHEED - CALIFORNIA COMPANY
A Division of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE ««>«: 162




I. It is the policy of the Lockheed- California Company to
A. Achieve a realistically high level of dispatch reliability and utilization
for its products, and to that end
1. Establish standards and specifications for reliability and
maintainability commensurate with program needs and compatible
with customer requirements.
2. Establish plans, programs and controls to achieve and sustain
required levels of reliability and maintainability during develop-
ment and production programs and during operational life.
3. Establish standards and techniques for Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) and for Quantitative Fault Tree Analysis
(QFTA) commensurate with the requirement of governmental
regulatory agencies.
4. Maintain a data collection and feedback system to provide
infornnation useful in identifying and solving reliability and
maintainability problems and establishing risk levels.
II. Responsibility is assigned and authority granted to
A. Commercial Product Support Branch to
1. Establish quantitative reliability and maintainability levels in
proposals, contracts and specifications.
2. Establish mathematical models and techniques for computing
maintenance costs, on-aircraft corrective maintenance time
allocations, reliability levels, dispatch levels and probability
of failure allocation.
3. Develop engineering nnaintainability and reliability design
criteria and conduct design surveillance. Prepare maintenance
engineering analyses and reliability analyses.
4. Prepare allocation of quantitative maintainability and reliability
levels which are to be reflected in the program plan.
. 5. Establish reliability and maintainability test reqxiirennents for
components and sytems as necessary to perform Quantitative
Fault Tree Analyses, Failure Mode and Effects Analyses,






A. 6. Evaluate progress of operational programs and report to management "^^
concerning achievement of nnaintainability levels, reliability levels, I
and probability of failure allocations. "''
7. Establish requirements for piece- part screening and burn- in/ run- in
. in specifications and proposals. Monitor these parameters in
operational programs as necessary to achieve the required reliability
levels, dispatch levels and probability of failure allocations.
8. Provide technical direction over the execution of initial measurement
programs and participate in all commercial reliability and maintain-
ability measurement programs,
9. Identify and analyze problem areas affecting achievement of naaintain-
ability and reliability goals and work with cognizant organizations to
establish corrective action.
10. In coordination with other branches, negotiate and maintain liaison
with:
a. LCC customers regarding achievement of reliability and
maintainability goals. \
b. LCC suppliers regarding achievement of reliability and maintain-
ability requirements, and compliance with their RScM program plans.
c. Regxilatory agencies regarding maintenance program development
and revisions, equipment reliability performance, and achievement
of probability- of- failure levels.
11. Prepare maintenance and facilities planning documents conforming to
maintainability plans and requirements. Coordinate with Engineering
in the resolution of any problenas arising from engineering plans and
requirements.
12. Collect and provide data from field operations and field flight test
programs to establish equipment reliability level.
13. Establish product reliability and maintainability data needs for
inclusion in the integrated failure-data collection and feedback systems.
Participate in the development of data collection program plans and in
the application of autonnatic data processing techniques.
14. Provide the Engineering Branch with M&R assistance in the design of
each Calac commercial product so that it incorporates requirements
for maintainability, reliability and supportability consistent with
those for performance, initial and operational cost, producibility,





II. A. 15. Perform Calac coordinating efforts for participation in industry and
government activities affecting maintainability and reliability
techniques. Maintain liaison with Lockheed companies, as appro-
priate, to insure timely interchange of maintainability, reliability
and risk measurement and prediction techniques.
B. Engineering Branch to
1. Design each Calac product so that requirements for maintainability,
reliability, and supportability are given consideration equal to
those for performance, initial and operational cost, producibility,
and weight and stress.
2. Assure that all data and information on reliability and maintainability
problems which become evident during development test programs are
made available to cognizant design, reliability and maintainability
personnel.
C. Q\aality Assurance Branch to
V
1. Participate with the Commercial Product Support Branch in estab-
lishing programs and controls to verify conformance of products
and components to reliability and maintainability requirements.
2. Establish and maintain an in- plant data center and acquire in- plant
production failure data sufficient to support reliability and main-
tainability activities.
3. Maintain liaison with suppliers in coordination with Materiel and
Commercial Product Support.
4. Coordinate with responsible Branches in the identification of design
problems and in the analysis of failure.
5. Participate with the responsible Branch in the conduct of reliability
and nnaintainability measurement programs for in- plant activities.
D. Materiel Branch to
1. Negotiate supplier guarantees for reliability and maintainability on
selected items as required to satisfy overall system requirements.
2. Participate with Quality Assurance and Commercial Product Support
in the negotiation for correction of quality and/or design deficiencies
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3. E. Administrative & Computer Services Branch to
1. Develop, at request of using Branches, automatic data processing
programs to support the reliability and maintainability data collection
and feedback system.
2. Provide automatic data processing reports to affected organizations
according to programmed reqviirements.
F. Commercial Program Planning to
1. Issue program letters when required to coordinate interbranch
activities associated with reliability and maintainability plans.
Establish and monitor schedules.
G. All affected organizations to
1. Participate in the collection and evalxiation of reliability and maintain-
ability data when requested to do so by the cognizant branches.
Explanatory Reniarks
j
I. Managennent Directive 40 establishes the Calac policy to ensure that Calac
' products meet all requisite standards of quality.
2. Management Directive 85 establishes the Calac policy to provide support
equipment and related data required for the efficient operation and
maintenance of each Calac product.
3. Management Directive 143 establishes the Calac policy to provide service
support required for the proper operation, maintenance, and best use of
each Calac product.
4. The term "Reliability" includes the establishment and measurement of
the product risk level, failure mode and effects analysis, and quantitative
faxilt tree analysis.
5. "Risk" is defined as the quantitative probability of a flight critical failure
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APPENDIX C -
SAMPLES OF OUTPUT REPORTS FROM
LOCKHEED'S OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DATA SYSTEM
The following reports are a sampling of the type and
variety of reports periodically processed by the L-1011
TriStar OSDS program. These standard output, yet specific
reports, are considered pertinent to the area of previous
design experience feedback.
Dispatch Reliability - Fleet (p. 106)
Mechanical Systems - Dispatch Reliability (p. 107)
Landing Gear Dispatch Reliability (p. 108-109)
Flight Control Dispatch Reliability (p. 110 -111)
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AVIATION RECURRING AND ON DEMAND
INFORMATION REPORTS PRODUCED BY
NAMSO
Aviation Information Reports produced by the Navy
Maintenance Support Office and available to both Department
of Defense activities and Defense contractors are listed
on the following pages of this appendix.
SOURCE: Navy Maintenance Support Office
Instruction, NAMSOINST 4790.1,
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SAMPLES OF FEEDBACK LOOP ACTION
GENERATION SYSTEM (FLAGS) RETRIEVAL
REQUESTS AND OUTPUT PRODUCTS
The following three examples, consisting of retrieval
request followed by output product, exhibit the inherent
flexibility of FLAGS to analyze, correlate and retrieve
information of different types and format.
Example 1 - Deficiency Status Summary (p. 119 -120)
Example 2 - BIS Y/S Deficiency Identification (p. 121 -122)
Example 3 - Detailed Deficiency Report (p. 123-124)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY





From: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
To: Commander, Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland





a) COMNAVAIRTESTCEN Itr Ser SA18/544 of 3 Jan 1978
b) NAVAIRSYSCOM RDT&E FLAG System Volumes I, II and III by
John C. Hemingway and CDR Paul R. Chatelier, NAVAIRSYSCOM,
Washington, D.C. of Feb 1977
(1) Sample Detailed Deficiency Report
(2) Sample Deficiency Report Status Summary
1. Reference (a) highlighted the need for an automated system of tracking
the status and disposition of F-18 weapon system deficiency reports and
recommended that the' Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) F-18 Program
Manager (PMA-265) employ a derivative of the existing NAVAIRSYSCOM Feed-
back Loop Action Generation (FLAG) System (described in reference (b))
for this purpose. During the past several months, AIR-531 and the Naval
Air Test Cantsr (NAVAIRTESTCEN) F-18 Program Office have reviev^ed existing
FLAG System capabilities in the light of recent F-14 Deficiency Report
management experience in order to anticipate NAVAIRSYSCOM and NAVAIRTEST-
CEN F-18 program Deficiency Report management and processing requirements.
Enclosures (1) and (2) contain the revised system output formats which are
expected to satisfy F-18 program Deficiency Report management needs.
2. In order to "debug" the revised FLAG system and have it in operation
by the start of F-18 testing in January 1979, AIR-5102F. AIR-531 and AIR-
503Z will work with the cognizant AIR-05 F-18 Project Support Officers
(PSOs) in upcoming months to initialize the system with existing F-18
Design Review Request for Action (RFA), Proposed Specification Change
Note (PSCN) transactions and mockup chits. The tracking of deficiencies,
starting with the RFA's and continuing throughout the life cycle of the
F-13 program, will allow documentation of technical decisions for each
deficiency and provide significant improvement in the preparation, review
and management of deficiency reports.
3. The degree of correlation between the RFA/PSCN/mockup chit entries
and subsequ2nt F-18 FSD deficiency reports is expected to provide
COMhAVAIRSYSCOM with a report card on the effectiveness of the F-18 design






lubj: Automated Tracking of F-18 Deficiencies
•-18 FSD Deficiency Reports, the corresponding PIAVAIRSYSCOM decisions, and
iubsequent fleet Unsatisfactory Report submissions will provide COMNAVAIR-
iYSCOM with a means to measure the effectiveness of the entire F-18 develop-
lent program, the impact of FSD program funding constraints, and the
lecfsi on-making batting average of key participants, including the contractor's
mgineering and management team. It is anticipated that this comprehensive
locumentation will have an overall enhancing effect upon the quality of
lecisions made during F-18 FSD, as well as future NAVAIRSYSCOM programs.
\, Upon completion of FLAG computer program initialization with F-18 RFA/
?SCN/mockup chit infonnation, A1R-5102F and AIR-531 will provide all
"NAVAIRSYSCOM and field activity participants with more definitive information
Dn the use of the FLAG System. The decision to recommend use of the FLAG
System on other NAVAIRSYSCOM weapon system development programs will be
nade by AIR-510 following review of the F-18 initialization effort. In
the interim, suggestions and recommendations to further improve and adapt
the Flag System and enclosures (1) and (2) to user needs should be forwarded
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